This article uses an economic narrative to examine the theoretical adequacy of applying humanitarian law to the regulation of the war on international terror. I argue that problems inherent with collective action impede the ability of this law to generate an optimal level of global security, and that the absence of the element of reciprocity reduces states' compliance. The paper discusses factors that mitigate these phenomena, such as audience costs, negative externalities of public conscience, NGOs' activities and the promotion of the humanitarian approach to humanitarian law by international bodies and courts. However, I maintain that the controversy among states over how to apply humanitarian law to the war on international terror might prevent these factors from counterbalancing the decrease in humanitarian law's status. Humanitarian law is therefore in danger of lapsing into irrelevance in this war.
I. Introduction
The attempt to explain the driving forces behind the development of the corpus of law of war, which is better known today as "international humanitarian law" (henceforth "humanitarian law"), has led scholars to concentrate on two main approaches: the humanitarian one and the utilitarian-military one. According to the latter, states act only according to their own interests, which are usually manifested through military power and national security. The advocates of this approach claim that a state's willingness to subordinate itself to the laws of war is proportional to the extent to which doing so would benefit its population and its military. This benefit stems from the fact that the laws of war usually constitute a reciprocal commitment between states, which is enforceable and meant to improve the states' welfare in two ways: by reducing the costs that result from the destructiveness of war and by reducing the investment in military capital needed to attain a military balance vis-à-vis another state. In contrast, the apologists of the humanitarian school of thought argue that the laws of war have developed as a result of states' internalization of humanitarian norms, which exist in every human being. These scholars maintain that such norms are capable of influencing states' willingness to deviate from self-interested conduct. This article questions the ability of the two approaches to regulate states' conduct in the war on international terror.
The law and economics literature on humanitarian law offers a number of models that explain the way this field has evolved and describe the role of humanitarian law in the regulation of states' conduct before and during wars. However, these models were formulated using the "classical" meaning of the term "war" -wars between states. In light of the mounting debate among legal scholars regarding the appropriate legal regime to confront international terror, this article reveals some of the weaknesses of humanitarian law in regulating this conflict. While the existing economic models consider humanitarian law as a means of decreasing damage and loss associated with war and minimizing the costs required to attain a military balance, I argue that in its present form, the capacity of humanitarian law to achieve these goals in the context of this global conflict is considerably limited by the war on international terror's unique characteristics. The article demonstrates through an economics-oriented narrative that the validity of the positivist explanations to states' adherence to humanitarian law during wars between states is limited in regard to wars conducted between states and non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations. This limitation is mainly due to the omission of reciprocity from this war, caused by terrorist organizations' lack of motivation to adhere to humanitarian law, and states' unwillingness to do so unilaterally. I claim that this situation results in the infringement of the steady-state balance which humanitarian law supposedly constituted in the past. Such a decline in states' adherence to humanitarian law is bound to increase the destructiveness and brutality associated with wars.
I further argue that while military balance was once achieved by a game between enemy countries, the level of global security generated in response to international terrorism is determined by a multilateral negotiating process between the states that enjoy this public good. There are collective action problems associated with the supply of a public good by numerous actors, specifically free riding, which characterizes coalitions with a militarily and economically dominant state, and leads to a suboptimal level of global security. I therefore claim that the frameworks in which the level of global security is currently determined prevent a sufficiently vigorous reaction to the threat of international terror.
This article discusses mitigating factors to these problems. In my opinion, the solution to a suboptimal supply of global security lies in multinational organizations' ability to impose the costs, which stem from production of the public good, on all states that enjoy it. The solution to the decline in the status of humanitarian law in the context of this conflict hinges on the strengthening of existing factors, which are liable to increase a state's motivation to adhere to international law in the absence of immediate military and utilitarian incentives to do so. Such a factor can be found in "audience costs," imposed by public opinion, and in public conscience externalities, which impose internal and international political costs on countries for the violation of humanitarian law. The importance of these costs has increased in recent decades due to the immediate and direct coverage of armed conflicts by the media and due to NGOs' scrupulous survey of states' conduct during those conflicts. A more significant balancing factor lies in international tribunals' ability and willingness to promote the humanitarian approach to the laws of war, mainly by making the existing standards more substantive and by enforcing the latter.
I further argue that the aforementioned factors' abilities to balance the decrease in the status of humanitarian law in the context of the war on international terror could be obstructed by the appearance of a new tripolar system, in which the actors' differing levels of commitment to humanitarian law prevent its unequivocal promotion and development.
The first actor is international terror organizations, which are indifferent to the dictates of humanitarian law and do not comply with it. The second actor is a group of states who seek to significantly promote and develop humanitarian law either for ideological reasons or because of their reluctance to ensure global security through military means. The third actor is a group of states, led by the US, which is significantly involved in military activity against international terrorism. In the eyes of this group, excessive promotion of humanitarian law could hinder their military efforts, and they therefore oppose this effort.
In light of this controversy, the accommodation of humanitarian law to its contemporary challenges is not guaranteed. Moreover, this situation could result in the creation of two different systems of international law, not unlike the state of affairs during the Cold War era.
II. The Humanitarian Approach and the Utilitarian-Military Approach to Humanitarian Law
Historically, the laws of war have developed in two separate categories, and this separation remains largely intact today. The first category, known as jus ad bellum, refers to the legality of the purpose of the war. The second, known as jus in bello, contains the laws of war and regulates the conduct of the belligerents, independent of the war's legality. This article concerns itself with the second category.
Two competing schools of thoughts -the humanitarian one and the utilitarian-military one -have persuaded the world of the importance of limiting war's devastating effects. The first one has done so through the internalization of basic humanitarian values, which are instilled in human nature. The second one has done so by dictating utilitarian and strategic motivations. Despite sharing a common objective, the two approaches are based on completely different principles. The humanitarian approach distinguishes between combatants and civilians but treats all civilians the same, no matter what side they are on.
According to this approach, an army must grant the enemy's civilians the same rights and respect it does its own population. Therefore, a combating army is compelled to respect the right to life of enemy civilians but not to protect it actively.
1 In contrast, the utilitarian approach, to which most governments and armies subscribe, does not derive from the human rights body. According to this paradigm, the role of humanitarian law is to minimize unnecessary suffering among combatants and civilians and to define the rules of engagement. This approach does not embrace rules that confer an advantage on one side unilaterally or rules that are not imposed equally on both sides. There is no doubt that most countries consider the laws of war as binding nowadays, and that they exert themselves to comply with them at least to some extent. The fact they bother to negotiate the subjects of the relevant conventions and ratify them while making reservations proves they place great importance on them. As will be explained below, NGOs' surveys of states' adherence to the relevant laws have also increased greatly in the modern era, and have influenced countries' willingness to adhere to the relevant conventions. As Benvenisti 13 explains, there still exists a wide gap "between the concerns that underlie the laws of war and the philosophy of human dignity that inspires many national bills of rights and international human rights law." It is also clear that utilitarian considerations cause countries to adopt strategic behavior while formulating the laws of war. However, the humanitarian clauses contained in the conventions of which humanitarian law is comprised establish the significant presence of the humanitarian approach in the dialogue on the regulation of war, and oblige the recognition of its influence on the development of the laws of war in general and their modern formulations in particular. 14 I will argue below that reinforcing this approach could play a significant role in mitigating the decline of states' adherence to the laws of war. 
III. Economic Explanations of the Development of the Laws of War
The discussion above makes it clear that economic interpretations of the evolution of humanitarian law cannot fully explain the way in which the laws of war have developed.
However central, the models and strategic behaviors described in this section comprise only one category of the motivations that may drive a state to take part in the codification of rules designated to limit war's brutality. 24 As depicted by Morrow, in each round -which can be seen as a battle in war -each state chooses whether to quit or continue the war and a battle strategy if it chooses to continue the war. The strategies chosen affect the military balance achieved in each round. The costs of fighting in a round depend on the current military balance, with costs rising as balance shifts against a state. The war continues until one side concedes the stakes to the other by quitting. A side will quit when the military balance shifts far enough against it that the costs of fighting exceed the value of the stakes in dispute. For an elaborated explanation of the model, see Morrow, supra note 19. See also D. Fundenberg & J. Tirole, Game Theory (MIT Press, 1991), at 119-26. 25 In this article, the term audience costs refers to the negative costs suffered by a serving government due to the infusion of international public opinion or the enemy's population with antagonism, or because of sanctions applied by the domestic public due to its dissatisfaction with the government's foreign policy. For an elaboration on the term and its influence on government decision-making, see J. Fearon Such dynamics are especially alarming in circumstances that lack equilibrium, in which ever increasing resources are invested in armaments. Although the model includes no 26 Examples of the complication of the model lie in its application to conditions of uncertainty or asymmetric information regarding the efficacy of battle strategies, the results of battles and the willingness of states to adhere to agreements. The model can also suffer from the problem of noise, according to which armies, or elements inside them, may disregard state policy to comply with existing treaties. Eventually, the aggrieved state's "zone of tolerance" to noises will decrease, as the damage sustained by the use of a forbidden strategy increases. consequently developing what could be considered an arms race. In equilibrium, both states will invest equal and positive amounts of resources in productive and military capital, and the more efficient the military technology becomes, the more resources will be invested in military capital, as the marginal utility in doing so will be higher than the marginal utility of investing an additional unit in productive capital. Since both states will exhibit the same behavior, their aggregate welfare will decrease. The outcome of the game reflects a prisoner's-dilemma-like logic, which is characterized by an excess of investment in military capital. . 32 According to the model, the efficiency with which resources are converted into military capital depends on the military technology -as it becomes more efficient, investment of one additional unit in military capital will obtain a larger share of the joint income, i.e. the marginal utility in doing so is higher. 33 Thus, Posner's proposition that the laws of war are designed to limit the efficiency of military technology, thus leading to a Pareto improvement in the states' welfare.
The model can be complicated by assuming that states hold an unequal amount of resources at the start. This situation may result in a phenomenon called the "paradox of power," according to which a weaker state can gain at a stronger state's expense. The limited potential gains that the stronger state may produce by appropriating the weaker state's income, may -in certain circumstances 34 -induce it to invest all its resources in productive capital and none of them in military capital. This fact will spur the weaker state to invest an even greater portion of its resources in military capital in order to appropriate the stronger state's income. This analysis leads to the second proposition regarding the reasons for banning certain military technologies -coalitions of strong states seek to limit weaker states' extraction power. As I will argue, the same interpretation can be applied to terrorist organizations.
These models propose an economic interpretation of the roles humanitarian law plays in the regulation of war, namely the reduction of war's brutality through the restraint of states' behavior and the provision of an optimal level of security in reply to threats. I will now argue that these objectives cannot be attained by humanitarian law in the context of the war on international terror.
IV. The Supplying of Global Security in the Face of the Threat of International Terror
The world's globalization process has accelerated during the 20 th century, with the appearance of innovations in the fields of technology, communications and transportation. 35 This fact is reflected in the unprecedented openness to flows of capital, 34 Posner, supra note 31. 35 Sandler & Hartley, supra note 30, at 321.
goods and manpower, and in international political and economic cooperation, which blurs boundaries between states. This process embodies the development of an ever-growing economic inter-dependency of the countries of the world 36 , which compels them to cooperate in order to preserve the stability of global security and global economy. The process of globalization has not left the elements that shape global security unaltered.
On the contrary, changes in the character of the threats to world peace constitute another factor that influences the status of humanitarian law. 40 Sandler & Hartley's definition of the term "international terror" reflects convincingly the global character of the threat -"The use, or threat of use of anxiety-inducing, extranormal violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, through its location, through the nature of its institutional or human victims, or through the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcends national boundaries". 46 See Benvenisti, supra note 23. Although there exists a large consensus regarding the fact that global stability and security constitute a public good, the adequate ways in which to provide it are subject to debate, mainly between the US and Western European states. 47 One can think of "rogue regimes" and states that support terrorism as states which do not enjoy this public good, since they seek to infringe the existing political and economic status quo by the use of means that are banned by humanitarian law. 48 Benvenisti, supra note 23. 49 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, 1965). 50 For a discussion of the problems associated with coalitions' collective actions, see Sandler & Hartley, supra note 30, at 23-24. 51 Id. at 44-51. stronger player is that the security level will remain suboptimal, thereby leading to a constant threat on stability. As Benvenisti pointed out, the fall of the iron curtain only amplified this phenomenon by leaving the US as the only super-power in the international arena. 52 Although the threat of international terror has raised the aggregate costs required to provide security, many states are reluctant to increase the resources allocated to security. The fact that the main threat on numerous Western states derives from terrorist organizations and not from their neighboring states, allows them to set themselves apart from the US and its allies, thereby deflecting the attention of terrorist organizations to other states. 53 Consequently, the damage expectancy, which stems from the threat of international terror, does not justify a substantial investment in security on their part.
I propose the addition of two new factors to an economic analysis of the war on international terror: First is the fact that international terror constitutes one of the main threats assessed by the US and its allies as they determine their level of investment in military capital. Second is the fact that the war on terror is generally conducted by a coalition of states and there are difficulties associated with the provision of a public good by numerous players. Hence, positivist economic models, which are based on premises that are consistent with wars in their "classical" meaning, are not expected to depict accurately the role humanitarian law plays in the context of the war on terror. I will use Posner's model to demonstrate this proposition, thus exposing the invalidity of the merits ascribed to humanitarian law in the context of the war on international terror. 52 Benvenisti suggests three factors which are expected to exacerbate the problem in the post Cold War eraFirst, the disappearance of the duopolic system, which does not allow the coordination of a mutual level of deterrence, thereby raising the costs of producing the public good. Second, states can set themselves apart from the US and its allies and thereby shield themselves from being targeted by terrorists. Third, the lack of agreement between the US and a number of other key actors, including members of the Permanent Five on the UN Security Council, on the ways to obtain the public good. conclusion that our era is characterized by a super-optimal level of investment in military capital. 55 However, taking into account the factors that distinguish the war on international terror from "classical" wars, mainly the occurrence of free riding, leads to the conclusion that the global level of security in response to international terror will be suboptimal.
Beyond theoretical implications for the economic analysis of humanitarian law, the discussion above leads to the normative conclusion that the resolution of collective action problems, which lead to a suboptimal aggregate level of security in reply to the threat of international terror, necessitates the formulation of a new set of rules that will regulate the investment in security of states which enjoy this public good. Contrary to what the existing models suggest, these rules cannot belong to the category of jus in bello, which regulates the conduct of belligerents. They must be capable of providing the appropriate frameworks for the regulation of allies' conduct among themselves. The US's inability to impose on its allies a part of the costs of security, proportional to their benefit from this product, 56 compels the establishment of such international frameworks, which will regulate the level of optimal aggregate security. This can be accomplished through instruments such as the "command mechanism", the voting system, or the Groves-Clarke tax, 57 which must include the ability to impose the costs that stem from the provision global security on the relevant states. Such frameworks can be based on existing . 57 The "command mechanism" relates to a mechanism in which the amount of the public good is determined by an actor or a group of actors. The "voting system" however, allows individual actors to vote on the provision of the public good. This device seems more appropriate in our context, and its limited ability to 61 For an elaborated discussion of the war on terror's unique characteristics, and the reasons for which those characteristics hinder the implementation of humanitarian law in its context, see Roberts, supra note 59. 62 Regarding the simultaneous implementation of laws of the two systems in this context, and the two systems' ability to function together and complement each other, see Watkin, supra note 39.
being, and in recent years they have become more similar to each other. 63 However, their concentration on different interests and frameworks and their different levels of tolerance for the killing of innocent civilians devise systems that differ both in their application of the principles on which they are based and in their way of balancing those principles with competing interests.
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It is difficult to determine whether acts of terror -even ones of colossal scale such as the attacks of September 11 th 2001 -amount to an international armed conflict. However, the fact that terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda are capable of posing threats of an equal scale to those posed by regular armies, and the fact many countries are reluctant to exercise their monopoly on the application of force within their territories to effectively combat international terrorism, render the regulation of the war on terror solely through the system of international human rights both impractical and dangerous. 65 It is therefore essential that humanitarian law remain as a principal tool for the regulating of wars between states and terrorist organizations.
The fact that the tendency of both the perpetrators and the opponents of international terror is not to abide by humanitarian law limits its usefulness. This problem stems first from the terrorist organizations' lack of commitment to international law in general and to its laws of war in particular. 66 A formalistic explanation would be that those laws pertain to states and not organizations, but a more substantive analysis would reveal that the laws of war sometimes ban the only effective strategies at the disposal of these groups. The only attempt to categorically forbid the use of terrorism on the part of the international 63 Regarding the advantages and disadvantages which stem from the approximation of the two systems, see Benison, supra note 10. 64 Watkin, supra note 39. 65 Id.
community failed with the refusal of the League of Nations to ratify the draft of the On the other side of the equation, the governments of the US and its allies, which typically subscribe to the utilitarian-military approach to humanitarian law, tend to demonstrate a decreasing adherence to the laws of war due to the almost total absence of reciprocity in this war. The utilitarian approach, which aspires to minimize unnecessary human suffering in war, is adopted by armies mainly because of strategic interests and concern for the wellbeing of their soldiers and their nation's civilians. Reciprocity is a vital element to the existence of utilitarian motivations in adherence to the laws of war, and has played a key The screening process model is also irrelevant to the war on international terror. The inability to oblige terrorist organizations to implement humanitarian law's conventions through audience costs and the omission of the element of reciprocity, has lead states to the compelling conclusion that it is impossible to reach agreement on treaties that can serve as reliable filters of permitted and banned strategies, with such organizations. As a result of the US and its allies' reluctance to implement the laws of war on a unilateral basis 88 , the materiality of humanitarian law to the war on international terror is limited in its present form, both with regard to the regulation of belligerents' conduct in war and the regulation of states' investment in security.
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism
From a utilitarian point of view, each side is therefore devoid of incentives to implement the laws of war. This lack of motivation is bound to lead to more frequent and more egregious violations of these laws, even by states that still exercise them to some extent.
This process of alienation and systematic repudiation will gradually set us further away from the equilibrium that humanitarian law was thought to constitute in the past, until the attainment of a new equilibrium. Predicting how this process will stabilize, i.e. how the laws of war will be formulated in the future, is difficult. But the notion that the absence of 86 Depending on tactical considerations, which could temporarily limit the power of the attack. 87 The US attack in Afghanistan, following the events of September 11 th 2001, constitutes an exception to this proposition. However, two remarks should be made in this regard. First, the American attack's effectiveness in neutralizing the threat of Al-Qaeda and apprehending its leaders is subject to debate. Second, the elimination of the only sheltering regime of the organization prevents the repetition of such a concentrated large-scale military offensive.
an external intervention in this process could lead states to comply only with laws that serve their immediate utilitarian interests is alarming. Such utilitarian laws will be found only in domains in which the element of reciprocity is still present, motivating both sides to decrease aggregate costs.
A conspicuous example of such mutual interest can be found in the question of POWs' status. Geneva Convention III, which concerns the treatment and status of prisoners of war, is considered part of the customary law of armed conflicts. 89 It obligates belligerents during any armed conflict, including limited military operations, whether war has been declared or not and whether the belligerents are parties to the convention or not. However, these protections are reserved for soldiers and other lawful combatants 90 . Civilians who are not members of a state's armed forces, such as terrorists, are usually 91 considered "unlawful combatants" or "unlawful belligerents." 92 They are entitled neither to the protection received by combatants, nor to all those granted to civilians according to article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I and Geneva Convention IV. 93 The US and its allies are therefore required by international law to distinguish between lawful combatants, such as the soldiers of the former Afghan Army (the Taliban), and unlawful combatants, such as citizens of other nations who fought in the ranks of Al-Qaeda during the war in Afghanistan in 2001. 94 Meron notes that despite the asymmetry between states and rebel forces, reciprocity is still relevant to such conflicts, as is shown by their mutual deterrence regarding the treatment of captured combatants. 95 Since states are allowed to apply the status of POW to every prisoner they capture -whether or not he or she is entitled to it by law -the presence of reciprocity may well apply this logic to conflicts between states and non-state actors other than rebels. It is indeed the element of reciprocity that led the Americans to grant the status of POW to both the soldiers of the North Vietnamese Armed This example demonstrates the process of decline in adherence to humanitarian law due to the lack of reciprocity. It seems that states' willingness to comply with the provisions of Geneva Convention III is conditioned by their belief that such compliance would trigger a similar response from the other party. Israel for example, which desires implementation of the convention with regard to its soldiers captured by the Hezbollah organization, has sometimes applied the convention to Hezbollah prisoners, despite the fact it considers 95 T. Meron, supra note 4, at 251. 96 See Gasser, supra note 39, at 567-568.
them terrorists rather than lawful combatants, hoping this will produce similar treatment of Israeli prisoners on the part of Hezbollah. 97 However, the unlikelihood of the possibility that the implementation of the convention on combatants -whether lawful or unlawfulcould lead to a reciprocal attitude of the enemy, will result in non-compliance with the laws relating to the status of POWs. Admittedly, states can provide themselves with a certain "zone of tolerance," which will induce them to grant members of terrorist organizations the status of POW in spite of sporadic infringements of the laws of war regarding their captive soldiers. However, the more frequent the infringements, the more states will be inclined to consider them as crossing a line allowing no such tolerant policy.
Alas, even where reciprocity is present, potential agreements, which would benefit both sides, might not be reached. This is due to the high transaction costs associated with such agreements. The dearth of international institutions that specialize in the regulating of relations between states and non-state actors, 98 and states' apprehension that dialogue with terrorist organizations might confer upon them a certain degree of legitimacy, render jointly efficient agreements unbeneficial to them. This factor coupled with the inability to enforce agreements on non-state actors due to the lack of reciprocity, may lead to a prisoner's dilemma, in which both parties' welfare is affected, thus resulting in a Pareto inefficient outcome.
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Considering the global character of the war on international terror, a decline in the status of humanitarian law could affect the situation of many individuals worldwide; first by increasing the destructiveness and brutality of the war on international terror and second 97 Green, supra note 89, at 214. 
VI. Mitigating Factors
The trend of decline in states' adherence to humanitarian law is not without mitigating factors, which already constitute part of the set of concerns considered by states as they determine the level of its commitment to humanitarian law. However, the trend described above necessitates the reinforcement of those factors to maintain a similar level of global commitment as existed in the past. Since states are not inclined to formulate agreements directly with non-state actors, a normative solution to this problem should be sought by increasing states' motivations to obey humanitarian law through external factors. The strength of these factors will depend on their ability to impose costs for violating humanitarian law. . 118 Benison notes that parts of the definitions of war crimes are standard-based rather than rule-based, the laws of war apply to both international and non-international armed conflicts and enforcement is based on prosecution of individuals rather than reprimands of governments. On the ways in which the ICC can further increase the approximation of the two systems in order to implement humanitarian law and international human rights on any person and within any conflict, see Benison, supra note 10.
combined implementation and development of the body of international human rights and humanitarian law, and could increase even further the humanization of the laws of war.
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However, international tribunals' fear that states might reject any decision that constrains their actions in the framework of the war on international terror, could deter them from vigorously promoting humanitarian law. Tribunals are not interested in the creation of a gap between them and the disputing states to an extent that will result in a rupture, thus undermining their standing. In view of such far-reaching attempts, states might raise arguments implying that humanitarian standards lack uniform interpretations, prevent belligerents from themselves assessing the legality of their actions during combat, and that the non-military orientation of the judges 120 prevents them from accurately evaluating concurrent military needs. 121 Still, states might comply with moderate dictates of the tribunals due to audience costs and the belief that doing so could improve their welfare in the long run. 122 The question of compliance will therefore be determined by the balance between these factors and the level of the costs imposed by the courts.
States' appraisals of the ability of the three above-discussed factors to impose costs for violating humanitarian law will determine the extent of their compliance with this law in the absence of immediate military and utilitarian incentives. The factors' ability to develop a sufficient counterbalance to preserve and perhaps promote the status of humanitarian law 119 Regarding the proposition that the judicial confrontation of international terror necessitates the interaction of a number of judicial systems, within the war on terror hinges on their ability to increase those penalizing costs. As I will argue below, this process may be obstructed by a growing controversy between nations over the appropriate way of accommodating humanitarian law to the war on international terror.
VII. A Tripolar System
The proposition that the war on terror reduces states' adherence to humanitarian law calls for an explanation of the amplification of the factors discussed in the previous section and the promotion of humanitarian law during the last two decades (which has manifested itself mainly in the establishment of international tribunals such as the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC). The settlement of this apparent inconsistency requires an understanding of states' different interests regarding the extent to which humanitarian law should be promoted. The gap between those interests was revealed during the preliminary work for the establishment of the ICC and the Rome Conference.
The negotiation of the establishment of a permanent tribunal, rather than an ad hoc one, disclosed significant differences between a group of states led by the US (as the state primarily involved in military operations on foreign soil) and a large group of states demonstrating an ever-increasing recoiling from such operations. 123 The US, as the only remaining super-power, is indeed deeply involved both militarily and financially in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement efforts, implementation of Security Council will demonstrate less adherence to its rules. The two courses were followed by different nations, which held different interests and views regarding the ways of promoting global security and stability. The US, which has proven since the end of the Cold War its willingness to conduct direct military interventions, has indeed obstructed the establishment of an effective ICC, fearing this body could impair its ability to actualize its supremacy and promote both global stability and its own interests. 129 The LMS and several Western European states strive to maintain global stability through different means, and it seems that their refusal to participate in military interventions for the promotion of peace and security has indeed been directly proportional to their support of a powerful ICC. 130 In that sense, the promotion of humanitarian law, i.e. its relevancy to the war on international terror, is now determined by the attitude of three different actors: 1).
organizations of international terror, which are indifferent to its dictates and do not participate in its development; 2). a group of states who wish to significantly promote and develop humanitarian law; 3). a group of states led by the US, which seeks to reduce humanitarian law. deter international terrorism, 133 and their apprehension that the promotion of humanitarian law could hinder their military efforts, have led them to adopt an approach that seeks to reduce humanitarian law and leads to a decrease in its implementation.
The emergence of this new tripolar system reduces the plausibility of promoting international law in an unequivocal course; whether by constricting it or by giving it a more humanitarian orientation. It is therefore unclear whether the mitigating factors described in the previous section, and especially the promotion of the humanitarian approach to humanitarian law, will be able to compensate for the decline in the status of humanitarian law. In the meantime, the United States' eroding away at the ICC's effectiveness, and its Western allies' reluctance to proportionally contribute to the military effort against international terror, impair both courses' ability to restore an optimal level of global security. Since both groups claim a valid perception of international law, an attempt to resolve this situation by further promoting their approaches could simply result in the creation of two different systems of international law, not unlike the state of affairs during the Cold War.
VIII. Conclusion
The increasing threat of international terror on global security and stability necessitates a renewed appraisal of the existing instruments' effectiveness in regulating states' conduct in the war on international terror and establishing an optimal level of global security in reply. This analysis raises the question of the adequacy of humanitarian law as a central device in the regulation of this war. As I have argued in this article, the unique attributes 133 Regarding criticism of the attempt to secure global peace and security through the sole means of international tribunals, see M. Néel, La judiciarisation internationale des criminels de guerre : la solution of the war, the problems of collective action and the appearance of a triangular relationship that impairs an unequivocal promotion of humanitarian law, raise serious doubts regarding the ability of this law to effectively attain such goals. Although this article contains no normative statement regarding the most appropriate judicial system to confront this problem -humanitarian law, criminal law, the body of international human rights, a lex specialis or a conjunction of these systems -it clearly argues that leaving humanitarian law unaltered will result in a reduction of its implementation.
The law and economics literature should therefore address the implication of these factors in order to develop a more relevant dialogue concerning the pursuance of the legal confrontation of this threat. As I have tried to demonstrate, pursuance of the examination of the materiality of humanitarian law to the war on international terror based on premises of "classical" wars obstructs such a dialogue. The article therefore suggests a number of
propositions that an economic analysis of the role of humanitarian law in this context should include.
An examination of the history of humanitarian law reveals that it has suffered from "status-cycles" in the modern era. While its development has progressed following atrocities, detachment from such events has led to its decline and to the intensification of brutality associated with it, until the next tragedy reverses the trend. If these cycles stem from a natural tendency to become less concerned with the promotion of humanitarian objectives the further away in time we are to a tragedy, a robust academic dialogue regarding the effectiveness of humanitarian law is indeed necessary to help the international community conceive utilitarian mechanisms to maintain its relevancy. 
